# Central Intelligence Agency



24 August 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR:	The Honorable Clyde D. Taylor Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters Department of State
FROM:	Chief, International Security Issues Division Office of Global Issues
SUBJECT:	Heroin Trafficking in Pakistan
questions you por for Narcotics re Pakistan.	ached memorandum was prepared in response to sed recently to the National Intelligence Officer garding heroin processing and trafficking in
2. This men International Sec Issues.	morandum was prepared by curity Issues Division, Office of Global
3. Comment	s and queries are welcome and may be addressed to egic Narcotics Branch, OGI
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	eroin Trafficking M 83-10200, August 1983,
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SUBJECT: The Khyber:	Heroin Trafficking Continues
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#### DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

23 August 1983

The Khyber: Heroin Trafficking Continues

### Summary

Heroin seizures in Pakistan, Europe, and the United States indicate heroin laboratories in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) still operate despite a November 1982 governmentinspired crackdown by tribal leaders. Tensions remain high as tribal traffickers and authorities clash over the narcotics issue. Although the Landi Kotal crackdown immobilized some processors, eliminated some laboratories, and dispersed a few refineries to surrounding areas including Afghanistan, we believe the city of Landi Kotal and its environs probably remains the center for narcotics processing in Pakistan. Sustained enforcement efforts are hampered as high-level Pakistani authorities disagree on the extent of heroin production in and around Landi Kotal and the ability of tribal leaders to enforce the ban. Stymied by their inability to close down the heroin laboratories, Pakistani enforcement officials may well redirect their efforts toward investigations of major international traffickers operating outside of the NWFP. US assistance and training programs may be of benefit in pursuing such investigations.

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This memorandum was prepared by International Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues. This analysis is based on information available as of 10 August 1983. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Strategic Narcotics Branch, OGI, on

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## Enforcement and the Traffickers' Reaction

In 1982, the Pakistani Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) reported publicly that Pakistan's rapidly rising heroin trade was centered in Landi Kotal where 30 laboratories were believed operating. Deep within the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province, where the government has little authority, this historical smuggling and trade city is strategically situated to host the heroin trade. It is close to the opium growing areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, not far from the important narcotics brokering center of Peshawar, and near the Afghan border, beyond which laboratories can safely relocate when pressure mounts in Pakistan.

In November 1982, President Zia, publicly recognizing that Pakistan faced a worsening heroin abuse problem and presumably responding to mounting US pressure, directed his political agent in Khyber Agency to order the tribal chiefs to stop the Landi Kotal heroin trade. Shortly thereafter, the tribal elders ordered the chemists to surrender their equipment or face fines of \$40,000 and public disgrace. Although Shinwari and some Afridi tribesmen violently opposed this decision, government officials told US Embassy representatives that by early December traffickers had been persuaded to surrender the hardware from 27 laboratories and that heroin production had ceased in the Khyber area.

Khyber traffickers have emphatically objected to the ban and to subsequent enforcement operations, viewing both as an infringement on their tribal sovereignty as well as a threat to their narcotics trade. Indeed, periodic rallies by tribesmen in defense of arrested drug traffickers have kept the Khyber area tense. In May, one Pakistani official reported to US Embassy officials that he was calling upon the Khyber Rifles almost daily to control anti-enforcement demonstrations organized by the United Federation of Tribesmen, a small but vocal group of agitators whose membership reportedly includes heroin traffickers. When the alleged head of the Landi Kotal branch of the Federation--himself a trafficker--was arrested, his followers reportedly organized a demonstration that blocked the eastern approach to the Khyber Pass. Outbursts such as these are probably directed in part at the United States which is regarded by tribesmen as the source of much of the current anti-narcotics sentiment in the

Despite the government-sponsored enforcement activities, heroin production and trafficking in Landi Kotal and its environs continues:

NWFP.

Landi Kotal heroin laboratory netted three traffickers, including a ring leader who allegedly was responsible for operating six of the seven laboratories that officials believe had been reestablished in the city.

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	Bara and Jamrud, both within 15 miles of Landi Kotal, were raided in June and several traffickers were arrested.	
•	During May and June the Khyber Political Agent, the Home Secretary for the NWFP, and the Chairman of the Pakistani Narcotics Control Board all reported to US Embassy officials that they had information on laboratories operating in the Landi Kotal area.	
• •	were set up at unspecified locations in Afghanistan after the governor of Jalalabad invited processors from Landi Kotal to Afghanistan, promising that they would be permitted to manufacture as much heroin as they wished under Democratic Republic of Afghanistan protection.	2
٥	four or five Shinwari tribesmen had accepted an invitation from Afghan officials to reestablish their laboratories across the Durand Line.	2
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be trying to deflect anti-narcotics pressure away from the NWFP. We believe they are motivated in part by a desire to prevent President Zia, who now is committed publicly to bringing heroin production under control, from being embarrassed by a failed program. Also, they are probably concerned that escalating anti-narcotics pressure in the NWFP could lead to destablizing confrontations between government authorities and militant Pathans. In this regard:

- Interior Secretary Roeded Khan recently told US officials that a political agreement with the tribes has led to the destruction of 41 heroin laboratories in the Khyber area and stressed that future effort should be coupled with developmental projects in the region.
- President Zia's Chief of Staff, General Arif explained to US officials that the government must be careful not to upset the traditional society if it expects to maintain the much-needed cooperation of the tribesmen on the narcotics issue.
- North-West Frontier Province Governor Fazle Haq has contended, until recently, that the November 1982 strike against the Landi Kotal laboratories all but eliminated heroin production in Pakistan. He has maintained that heroin seized in Pakistan since November originated in Afghanistan, citing a 396 kilogram shipment confiscated by Pakistani Customs near Peshawar in December 1982 as an example. Laboratory analysis, however, reveals that this and other large seizures contained nothing more than heroin residue, and suggest that these seizures may in fact have been staged by NWFP officials.

#### Outlook

Pakistani authorities—especially if prompted by US officials—will probably continue to urge tribal leaders to move against heroin laboratories in the Khyber area, but we believe it likely that a nucleus of heroin processors will continue to operate in the Khyber area beyond the reach of the government and with the tacit consent of tribal leaders. Despite government encouragement, tribal leaders probably will not pursue processors across the border into Afghanistan, and their enforcement actions in the Khyber probably will be selective, targeting first those traffickers who are agitators drawing unwelcomed attention to the area. Government officials who are worried that extensive anti-narcotics sweeps could destabilize the tribal areas will prevent enforcement authorities from carrying out major operations on their own.

Stymied by their inability to close down the heroin laboratories, Pakistani enforcement officials may well redirect their efforts--activities that would benefit from US assistance

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and training programs—toward investigations of major international traffickers operating from brokering centers such as Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi. Enforcement activities should be aided by improved anti-narcotics legislation that Interior Minister Kahn has said is forthcoming, although problems posed by the need for coordination among Pakistani enforcement agencies and insufficient manpower, intelligence, and investigative skills will still have to be resolved.

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